Friday 22 January 2016

Week 4 - CIA Involvement and the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF)



I have added two short primary sources to our OWL site, because they are too big to paste here. Please take a look at them both. They are:

1. An article by Tom Braden of the CIA published in the Saturday Evening Post after the revelations of CIA involvement in a host of private cultural organizations. (Braden on CIA expose.pdf)

2. An appendix from Wellens' book which lists the works performed at the Congress for Cultural Freedom's Paris festival in 1952. (Wellens appendix.pdf)

You need only answer one of the two sets of questions below - each refers to one of these sources.

1. Braden article: What kind of rhetoric and argumentation does Braden employ as a means to defend the secret funding of cultural organizations? What strategies does he use to appeal to the reader?

2. CCF repertoire list: What does this repertoire list tell us about the political and aesthetic message of the CCF's Paris Festival?

10 comments:

  1. In this article Braden presents himself, and everyone else involved, as being situated at one end of opposite poles. Much like other aspects of the Cold War one could either be totally for the creation of this organization that could win the fight against the spread of communism, or totally against it. He does this by presenting characters that were in positions of power that were either incapable of seeing the necessity of the CIA’s actions (like congressman and area division chiefs), or who were with him right from the beginning (like Alan Dulles and Frank Wisner).
    He begins his argument insulting those who brought the secret operation to the surface, calling them “small-minded and resentful.” He then feigns the appearance of confusion, as if to convey that he now entertains the notion that his involvement in this situation should make him question his mental capacity. But then his inner struggle comes to an end and he asserts that all he has been reading is “misinformed twaddle.” This is an intelligent tactic, to make it seem like everything he has been hearing is so untrue that he might actually believe that he is crazy. He then moves to the section of his argument that he knows will win people over and make the whole operation look like a success: the money. He does this by thoroughly explaining the amount that the Soviets were spending through the international Communist front. Later in the article he makes sure to present an example that shows how the CIA cut a subsidy that was being wasteful and ineffective. This presentation of the CIA’s more fiscally responsible method later in the article spreads out his intention to demean the Soviet method.
    Braden’s most persuasive tactic is to continually assert that the Soviet’s were initially defeating the Americans in their attempt to stop the spread of communism. But of course by the end of the article, once he has presented all of the information that he wants the reader to see, he explains how the methods of the CIA slowly began to work and put America on equal ground with the Soviets. His maxim at the end about the choice between “innocence and power” can be perceived as both an apology for being dishonest with the American public, and a response saying “you’re welcome” for finding a way to give America the upper hand in the Cold War.

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  2. Thomas Braden appeals to anti-Communist readers’ anti-Communism using a manipulative argument where he questions then affirms his actions, causing the reader to question their accusation of the immorality of the CIA. He seems to engage in dialogue with himself by feigning embarrassment and admitting to certain actions of the CIA, yet establishes the “truth” of the CIA with anecdotes that prove these actions were justified and noble. His admission that actions such as the donation of $150,000 to Irving Brown looked suspicious, demonstrate the CIA were willing to take responsibility for their actions. He demonstrates, however, throughout the rest of the article, that these were useful, well-meaning and ultimately successful actions despite how they may have looked to the public. His lack of denial and semblance of transparency makes him seem honest and genuine in order to appeal to the readers’ sensibilities.

    The mix of anecdotes and formal lists makes the article appear accessible and well-supported. Stories of weighing of options when it came to the CIA’s decisions when contrasted with lists of the Soviet Union’s fronts tend to provoke a more sympathetic attitude toward the CIA who are shown as being more human than statistics. When he speaks of moments where the Americans gained acclaim or success, he poses the statement as a fond memory in order to allow the reader to also look back at this positive accomplishment, and recognize the effectiveness and inherent correctness of the CIA. These stylistic techniques are relatable and invite the reader to simultaneously learn about the CIA and see how human and likeable Braden and others were, despite their “immoral” actions. He justifies the secret funding by saying that it was only as immoral as the war itself was immoral, which seems to challenge the reader to disagree with his explanation and risk looking like a Soviet-sympathizer. Braden forces the reader to side either with the CIA or the USSR.

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  3. In 1952 the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) sponsored a music festival in Paris billed as "L’Œuvre de XXe Siècle" with the purpose of promoting an image of America as a leader in musical high culture. The festival was a month long and featured a variety of concert pieces by composers from around the globe. The opening night featured the Boston Symphony Orchestra performing Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring, an ideal symbol of creative freedom and international collaboration (Stravinsky, originally Russian, spent the better part of two decades in Paris before moving to California and becoming an American citizen). The list of performed works spans many genres of high art music, from English opera to Hungarian choral pieces to American overtures to Russian piano concerti. While the repertoire heavily favored well-established European composers from Germany, France, England, and Italy, others were included from countries as distant as Brazil (Heitor Villa-Lobos). Politically speaking, it was a successful assembly of composers from across the globe and demonstrated that musicians from smaller or less-developed nations were still on the same level as those from the powerhouses of Germany and France.

    Aesthetically, the selected list of works is quite conservative and did not push the envelope in many ways. Works such as Schoenberg’s Erwartung and Berg’s Wozzeck had premiered respectively in 1924 and 1925, nearly thirty years in the past, but still represented some of the most ‘far-out’ musical fare. American composers were represented, but their offerings consisted primarily of smaller, pseudo-tonal compositions. American composers such as Barber, Copland, Ives, and Piston were on the bill, but were each granted only one or two works, none of which were symphonies. In contrast, five works by Ravel and a staggering nine by Stravinsky were performed over the course of the festival. This implies a reluctance on the part of the CCF to promote music that was considered too American or too modern, preferring instead to present a mixed palette of music from around the globe while remaining deferent to the perceived superiority of European composers from the pre-War era.

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  4. Interestingly, the list of repertoire focuses more on music from the early 1900s and seems to avoid the more modern, seralist composers such as John Cage and Milton Babbit. In addition, the music included on this list was much of the music banned from the USSR. The repertoire on this concert spans composers from countries such as Italy, France, the USSR, Germany, and England. However, the repertoire list only includes a few works by American composers including Barber and Copland. The repertoire list also has many large scale works such as operas, symphonies, concertos, and choral pieces.

    Based upon this repertoire list, it seems evident the CCF wanted the world to see that American musicians could play wonderful virtuosic music that was wrongfully banned by the USSR. I think the CCF wanted to prove the USA has a rich culture and the symphony orchestras, choirs etc from the US could play music very well because their culture was so rich. It also appears that the CCF did not want to choose any music that was too modern as they believed if a work was not likely to impress foreign opinions, it should be ignored. The CCF wanted to turn the public opinion of the world to America and they felt by playing music that people enjoyed well, the public opinion would rise and people would be accepting of the American way of life.

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  5. The CCF’s intentions were to alter the image of America. Virtuoso players were in favor as America wanted to show their cultural competence to the Europeans. Using the Boston Symphony, they hoped virtuosic playing would solidify that American musicians could play traditional classical music just as well as any European musician. In the program, the CCF focused on earlier European works that had been banned by the Soviets. Despite the popularity of avant-garde artists such as Milton Babbit and John Cage, the CCF chose music from European composers such as Debussy and Fauré. The program did have several modern American composers such as Copland and Barber, as well as Russian composers like Stravinsky and Shostakovich. It seems that only music considered communist was excluded from the program, not Russian music altogether. It is interesting that they did not program music by some of the most prominent composers such as Beethoven, Bach and Mozart because their music was affiliated with authoritarianism from Nazi Germany and communism from the Soviets.

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  6. Along with insulting the intelligence of those who disagree with him (calling them “small-minded,” “naive,” and “uninformed,” to list a few) Braden explains the morality of secret government funded Cold War operations and makes a claim for their necessity. In defense of the morality, he characterizes the CIA’s actions as self-defense against the Soviets, implying both morality and legality. Further, he claims that the only reason for these actions to be considered immoral is because they were acts of war and war itself is immoral. This indicates that the CIA’s actions were purely responsive, consistent with the self-defense argument, and thus only as a result of necessity.

    The constant reiteration of the necessity of these actions frames the question of morality in an ‘ends justifies the means’ manner. The necessity of the secret funding was backed largely by an ultimatum: that America would either win or lose this war, and if the secret funding did not occur, America surely would be choosing defeat. When talking about the great national and moral benefits of these secret operations he says that “few of them would have been possible without any undercover methods,” and blames the American two-party political system for the necessity of secrecy.

    This whole argument is administered with calculated sincerity. This tone was likely important because anything other than a soft and agreeable voice could have been received with immediate refusal and confrontation in the midst of all the negative attention the CIA was getting in regards to this secret funding. This sincerity was incorporated into the text by reassuring readers that he and and his audience were humans all the same, with stories from his experiences and portrayal of himself as an emotional being, reacting with sadness to the perceptions of the organization and the cause he dedicated himself to. Further, he shows this emotion and dedication to this organization by including in the story that he was prepared to go so far as to lost his job over this cause. It seems that Braden had hoped his conviction to this cause would be contagious. As the pinnacle claim to his and the CIA’s sincerity he says, “we started with nothing but the truth.” He bases the entire program on a foundation of absolute truth which inevitably links itself to morality. This leaves readers with the implication that perhaps to disagree with the author’s sincere belief is to disagree with truth, to reject fact, and to forgo morality.

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  7. In 1952, the Committee for Cultural Freedom, a group funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States’ government, sponsored a music festival in Paris; this festival was titled the “Masterpieces of the 20th Century.” The purpose of this festival was to establish the USA as a leader in the art music world.
    The repertoire list from this festival includes a wide range of composers. The list includes both tonal-based music by composers such as Debussy and Mahler and serial music by the likes of Schoenberg and Webern; however, American avant-garde composers such as John Cage and Milton Babbitt were excluded from the festival. This demonstrates a reluctance on the part of the organizers to display a music whose place in the musical cannon had not been firmly established. The repertoire list reads like a “who’s who” of early 20th century composers rather than taking a risk on musicians who’s compositional ideologies were still up for debate.
    Interestingly, the list includes Soviet composers. These were composers who had either fled the USSR (Rachmaninoff) or had complicated relationships with the communist government (Shostakovich). The Soviet composers who were included in the program had been denounced by fascist groups such as the German Nazis; therefore, the purpose behind including them was to likely demonstrate to the people the powerful music which was suppressed under communistic rule.

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  8. Former CIA employee Thomas W. Braden (1967), in his article in the "Speaking Out" section of the Saturday Evening Post, attempts to reinscribe many of the binaries conceived by earlier uses of anticommunist rhetoric, such as Senator Joseph McCarthy's "with us or against us" approach. As Christina commented, Braden uses a coercive question-and-answer rhetorical strategy to achieve this end; he begins with a general question framed as a charge against anticommunist CIA operations, and answers this question with reference to a specific CIA activity, which he casts as an honorable deed to secure national freedom. Obviously, this winds up vindicating whichever activity he references, and at the same time dismisses the wider scope of the charge against the CIA, such as the assertion that its activities are immoral or disgraceful. In short, this strategy falsely constructs the poles of an argument.

    Braden also makes less obvious appeals to nostalgia and his own personal experiences working with the CIA. His search for an old receipt for covert CIA funding to anticommunist efforts is cast as "wistful," and following this he brings us into a line of questioning that cleverly shows a glimmer of self-doubt, and then resolve for his past actions. Braden wishes to align personal vindication with the vindication of the CIA's anticommunist activities.

    Finally, while the Saturday Evening Post editors take a "neutral" position in the footnote on page 10, they have allowed this article to be published, and have designed the layout and selected advertisements strategically. Braden is pictured smiling in a corduroy suit, in a bid to evoke sincerity, charm and inoffensive professionalism (10). The Ray-Ban advertisement mentions, between em dashes, that their lenses are "developed for the Air Force," in an appeal to U.S. nationalism and military strength, while the Yale lock advertisement reinforces Braden's plea for national security. I could make greater leaps with the other advertisements, but I think I'll stop there...

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  9. The 1952 Paris music festival—L’Oeuvre du XXe Siécle—organized by the American-based Congress of Cultural Freedom (CFF) was not so much a presentation of the United States’ ability to produce high-modernist music, as it was a demonstration that the capitalist nation had a deep appreciation for Western classical music (and thus, high culture). This contrasts greatly with the goals of cultural diplomacy in the 1960’s, wherein the US was not satisfied with only being seen as a connoisseur of high art, but also demanded to be doubly recognized as a cultivator of high art and culture (now taking the form of avant-garde music) (Fosler-Lussier, 2008, 234).

    The repertoire list for the festival—in addition to serving this purpose of proving Americans could appreciate European high-culture—also had an underlying political message lurking underneath. Whereas musical presentations in the avant-garde period of American cultural diplomacy were intended to demonstrate purported “American ideals” manifested in the music itself—such as relating “freedom” to composers’ use of serialism and rejection of conventions—the 1952 music festival, with its mixed bag of musical personalities and styles condemned and derided by the Soviet Union, acted as a kind a retort to both Stalinism and socialist realism.

    Curiously though, upon examining the repertoire list more closely, one is immediately struck by the relative conservativeness of the pieces included. The year was 1952; where were the cutting edge experimental composers such as John Cage and Karlheinz Stockhausen? Indeed, even the majority of the composers whose works were included in the festival composed primarily in tonal (non-serial) idiom, or made great employ of tonal methods and concepts (for example, Scriabin). Considering the Soviet Union’s impassioned hatred of serialism, wouldn’t it have been a more effective affront to create a program laden with serial works? That the repertoire list greatly emphasized (by this point in 1952) older composers and styles such as Debussy (impressionism), Strauss (late German romanticism), and Stravinsky (primitivism and neoclassicism), betrays the pervasive bias of the chair of the CFF, Nicholas Nabakov. He himself admitted that he “[would] always remain deeply rooted in the tonal tradition of Russian music” (Wellens, 2002, 122) [1].



    1. The influence of Nabakov’s personal bias towards traditional, tonal music in designing the program for the Paris festival calls to mind Fosler-Lussier’s “bottom-up” diagram detailing the complex network of agents involved in Cold War American cultural diplomacy. See Fosler-Lussier, 2015, 25.

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  10. The 1952 Festival of Masterpieces held in Paris was a concerted effort by The CCF that saw America losing ground to the Soviet Union in what has been called the “Battle of the Festivals”. The pro-Communist World Peace Conferences in New York and later in Paris were well organized. Any pro-Western content was met with swift resistance. Furthermore, David Rousset’s International Day of Resistance to Dictatorship and War held in response to the World Peace Conference (Apr 1949) was considered a failure.

    Nicolas Nabokov’s program for Masterpieces of the Twentieth Century has an unmistakeable anti-Soviet sub-text; over 70 of the works or artists invited to participate at the festival had been banned in the Soviet Union, including Russian born composers Dmitri Shostakovtch and Serge Prokofiev, sending a clear message about the ideology of freedom in the West. The strong statement made by the international make up of the participants helped put the pro-Western movement back in the game. The diverse program is well represented by American composers and performers as are the genres of the works. Although a number of Avant-Garde pieces are included, noticeably absent from the program are composers such as Cage and Babbitt demonstrating that the CCF had yet to put its support behind 12-tone music.

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